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The Extrapolation Conundrum: Finding a Unified Theory for the Use of Statistical Sampling in
Medicare Fraud Cases Brought Under the False Claims Act
Thomas Reilly*
I. Introduction
Healthcare fraud has become one of the federal government’s costliest problems. The
government spends over one trillion dollars every year on Medicare and Medicaid.1 Total
spending on healthcare in America is around 2.7 trillions dollars, roughly seventeen percent of
the nation’s gross domestic product.2 Despite—or perhaps, because of—the massive amounts
spent on healthcare, Medicare and Medicaid “have become a sitting duck for fraudulent
activity.”3 In spite of constant attempts by both the FBI and the Department of Justice, Medicare
and Medicaid fraud continue to cost the government—and thus taxpayers—billions of dollars.4
Indeed, though estimates vary, fraud and systematic overcharging are estimated to cost the
government roughly sixty billion dollars every year, totaling roughly ten percent of Medicare’s
annual costs.5
This widespread fraud stems in large part from the fact that the Medicare and Medicaid
systems are, by their very nature, vulnerable to fraudulent activity conducted by dishonest
practitioners. Indeed, “the United States Government Accounting Office has labeled both the
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Medicare and Medicaid programs ‘high-risk programs.’”6 Much of the problem stems from the
fact that “the government pays [Medicare and Medicaid bills] on an honor system, requiring only
electronic submission to claims for services or goods provided by a health care provider.7 The
relative ease with which health care providers can file a claim was originally designed to provide
quick and efficient payment to doctors who could then treat the poor and the needy; but, in more
recent times, this lack of oversight has made it all too easy for dishonest health care providers to
exploit the system.8 To make matters worse, “[no] built-in checks and balances or due diligence
exists to protect the Medicare giant from the onslaught of [fraudulent activity].”9 The “[s]hear
volume” of health care claims submitted each year under Medicare and Medicaid only adds to
the problem, as the government faces the seemingly unfeasible task of sorting out proper claims
from fraudulent ones in a pool of millions of claims submitted by millions of Americans.10
With executive, administrative, and institutional efforts failing to prevent widespread health
care fraud, the government has come to rely more and more on an old, though still very useful
tool: the False Claims Act.11 For many years, the federal government has considered the False
Claims Act (FCA) to be its primary instrument in preventing fraud against the government. 12
Today, private actions brought under the FCA play a “vital role” in fighting Medicare fraud.13 In
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Health Care Fraud and False Claims, PIETRAGALLO GORDON ALFANO BOSICK & RASPANTI LLP,
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2014 alone, the Department of Justice recovered over two billion dollars in health care-related
FCA actions.14
The FCA is not without its drawbacks, however. Health care fraud cases brought under the
FCA are often large, unwieldy affairs involving thousands of claims.15 Faced with the practical
impossibility of sorting through such a large volume of claims, the government and private
relators have turned to statistical sampling—sometimes called “extrapolation”—as an efficient
way to determine the characteristics of large sets of data.16 Statistical sampling is an
economically efficient and scientifically accepted mathematical method for drawing inferences
and generalizations about a large set of data based on a subset data.17 Furthermore, it has long
been established that statistical sampling is a viable method for proving damages in FCA cases,
and most courts have allowed its use for this limited purpose.18
In recent years, the government has begun a push towards using statistical sampling not only
for proving damages, but for proving liability as well.19 Courts have split on the issue; some
have allowed statistical sampling for proving liability, some have allowed it only for proving
damages, and still others have not allowed it at all.20 Yet there remains no unified theory for
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Press Release, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recoversnearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014.
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16
See id.
17
See generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Evidence at the Crossroads, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 969
(2007) (providing the history and scientific background of statistical sampling).
18
See United States v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240 (D.P.R. 2000) (establishing that statistical sampling
is generally permitted for establishing damages and providing an overview of cases that have permitted it).
19
Matthew D. Benedetto, Statistical Sampling on the Rise in False Claims Act Cases, LOS ANGELES DAILY
JOURNAL (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/statistical-samplingon-the-rise-in-false-claims-act-cases.pdf.
20
For concise arguments on both sides of the issue, compare United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty.,
Inc., No. 0:12-3466-JFA, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379 (D.S.C. June 25, 2015) (prohibiting statistical sampling), with
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., No. 1:08-cv-251, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660 (E.D. Tenn.
Sep. 29, 2014) (allowing statistical sampling).
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when and how statistical sampling should be implemented. The courts that have addressed the
issue have held for one approach or the other without espousing a guiding framework that can be
applied on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, courts addressing the use of statistical sampling
have taken ostensibly extreme approaches, allowing either an uninhibited use of statistical
sampling or, alternatively, a restricted approach that prohibits the use of statistical sampling in
almost every instance.
This comment will argue for a middle ground between these extreme approaches while
developing a single, unified framework for determining whether statistical sampling should be
permitted in a given case. Part II will provide a more detailed overview of the history and
development of the FCA and the use of statistical sampling. Part III will provide an analysis of
the reasons courts have provided for allowing the use of statistical sampling, while Part IV will
analyze the reasons courts have given for prohibiting the use of statistical sampling. Finally, Part
V will put forth a unified framework for the use of statistical sampling in FCA cases, while also
explaining the framework’s origins and various rationales.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that this note only addresses the issue of when
statistical sampling should be used for proving liability because it is well settled, with perhaps a
few outliers, that statistical sampling is generally agreed to be permissible for calculating
damages.21 Furthermore, this comment will address only the use of statistical sampling in health
care fraud cases brought in federal court under the FCA, and will not address statistical sampling
in other contexts, such as mass tort cases, or the use of statistical sampling in administrative
rulings.22

21

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am. at *36 (“Appeals from administrative agency decisions are
distinguishable from [cases brought under the FCA] because they are considered by an appellate court under a
different standard of review.”).
22
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In attempting to create a unified framework for statistical sampling, this comment will
endeavor to reconcile the various cautions, concerns, and principles that have led courts to come
out on different sides of the issue. This unified framework will provide for a cautionary
approach to the use of statistical sampling for proving liability in FCA cases. In particular, it
will require the party proposing to use statistical sampling to show some legitimate reason for
why the use of statistical sampling will be necessary. The effect will be to create what is in
essence a rebuttable presumption23 against the use of statistical sampling for proving liability,
which can be overcome by a showing of hardship on the party proposing to use statistical
sampling, or where claim-by-claim review is a practicable impossibility. The ultimate result of
this approach will be a legal framework that allows the government and private relators to have
access to statistical sampling in cases where it is necessary to prevent large-scale fraud, while
also preventing its use in smaller cases where the benefits are slight and there is a large potential
for abuse.
II. A Brief History of the FCA and Statistical Sampling
A. The Humble Origins and Modern Power of the False Claims Act
The FCA imposes liability on any person who knowingly presents the United States with
a false or fraudulent claim for payment.24 Under the FCA, private individuals, legally known as
“relators,” are permitted to bring suits in the government’s name, known as qui tam suits, for
fraudulent conduct committed against the United States.25 The False Claims Act was originally
implemented during the Civil War as a way for the federal government to control fraud on the

The term “rebuttable presumption” in this sense means a presumption against the legitimacy of statistical
sampling in a given case that can be overcome by a showing of additional facts that warrant its use. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (6th ed. 1990).
24
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
25
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
23
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part of defense contractors.26 But as the federal government’s involvement in the national
economy continued to grow throughout the Twentieth Century, and as pervasive fraud became
ever more present, the once innocuous False Claims Act began to take a more central role in the
government’s attempts to prevent fraud.27 In the 1980s, against a backdrop of national efforts to
encourage whistleblowing against health care fraud,28 the FCA took on its current form.29 As
currently constructed, the FCA imposes severe penalties on violators, including a provision for
treble damages and fines of up to ten thousand dollars per claim.30 Private relators, for their part,
receive substantial rewards ranging from between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the proceeds
of the action or settlement of the claim.31 Together, this system of penalties and rewards, which
came to full fruition through the enactment of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, lay at the heart
of an increasingly aggressive government scheme to root out fraudulent activity.32
The aggressive enforcement scheme prompted by the 1986 amendments to the FCA has
fallen heavily—perhaps even disproportionately—in the field of health care.33 Indeed, the
modern FCA has become a “nightmare for the health care industry,” as “[h]ealth care providers
have discovered that billing errors once viewed as mistakes in need of correction, are now
attacked as crimes that compel million dollar settlements.”34 The focus on health care fraud has
also come in conjunction with a massive rise in litigation brought under the FCA since the

26

See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves Into a Modern
Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458 (1998).
27
See id. at 459–61.
28
See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for
Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 275–83 (1992).
29
See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 461.
30
31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012).
31
31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1) (2012).
32
See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 460.
33
See Frank LaSalle, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for
Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 502 (1995).
34
See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 456.
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enactment of the 1986 amendments.35 As an example, there were twelve qui tam cases brought
under the FCA in 1987, compared to two hundred and twenty brought in 1994.36 Over seven
hundred qui tam actions have been brought under the FCA in every year since 2010.37
With health care fraud now standing front and center in cases brought under the FCA,
and with litigation on the rise, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the government is willing
to push the boundaries of permissible methods of proving liability. Statistical sampling now
stands at the forefront of one of the largest and most important areas of federal litigation, and its
fate as a tool for proving liability will have a massive effect in shaping the future of health care
fraud litigation.38
B. The History and Development of Statistical Sampling
Statistical sampling is not a new evidentiary method. On the contrary, and perhaps
surprisingly, it has been used in litigation since as early as the 1920s.39 And while statistical
sampling has been used—if not always accepted—in litigation for nearly a century, it has been
recognized as a legitimate mathematical methodology in the world of science for even longer.40
Statistical sampling was first permitted in a trademark case in 1940, and it had “gained full
acceptance in trademark law” by 1963.41 By 1990, statistical sampling had made its way into
mass tort cases.42 Today, courts and legal scholars generally recognize statistical sampling as a

35

See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 456; LaSalle, supra note 33, at 501–02.
LaSalle, supra note 33, at 501.
37
2014 Year-End False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Year-End-False-Claims-Act-Update.aspx.
38
See Benedetto, supra note 19.
39
See Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376 (D. Del. 1928) (disallowing the use of statistical
sampling in a trademark dispute).
40
See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 974 (“Sampling came to law later than to science.”).
41
See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 975.
42
See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 976.
36
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viable evidentiary method, and statistical reasoning and analysis is routinely used in "antitrust,
employment discrimination, toxic torts, and voting rights cases.”43
In general, statistical sampling is a methodology whereby a small sample of data is used
to determine the characteristics of a much larger set of data.44 While the specific process
sometimes differs based on a variety of complex factors, statisticians tend to adhere to several
basic principles in order to minimize bias and ensure the highest degree of accuracy possible.45
To put the matter succinctly, “a good survey defines an appropriate population, uses a probability
method for selecting the sample, has a high response rate, and gathers accurate information on
the sample units. When these goals are met, the sample tends to be representative of the
population. Data from the sample can be extrapolated.”46
To be sure, statistical sampling is not a matter of simple number crunching. In fact,
parties seeking to use statistical sampling in a particular case, even if just as a calculation of
damages, will usually require the use of a statistician as an expert witness for purposes of
developing the appropriate statistical method for the given facts and making the appropriate
calculations for extrapolating the sample to the entire universe of claims.47 In health care fraud
cases in particular, statistical sampling often involves complicated methods for determining “the
population of interest” from among thousands of claims, while also “identify[ing] a data source
from which the sample will be drawn” to fit into a “sampling frame” which “comprehensively

43

David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 211, 213 (3d ed. 2011).
44
See, e.g., id. (explaining the methodology and process behind the use of statistics in litigation); Walker &
Monahan, supra note 17 (providing a history and general background on statistical sampling).
45
See generally Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43 (providing an in-depth explanation of statistical sampling
methodology).
46
Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 226.
47
See, e.g., United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379; United States
ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660.
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reflect[s] the population.”48 With such complex calculations, and with so many variables in play,
statistical sampling inevitably involves at least some margin for error.49
It must be made clear that, while statistical sampling is a generally accepted evidentiary
method, there is a large difference between the way in which statistical sampling has
traditionally been used and the proposal for using statistical sampling as a means of proving
liability in health care fraud cases brought under the FCA. Historically, statistical sampling has
been used as a method either for determining damages or for demonstrating the external
characteristics or beliefs of a population subset.50 For instance, in trademark cases, where
statistical sampling first made its mark on the law, it was used primarily in regards to surveys as
a means of demonstrating market confusion.51 In the context of mass torts, it has typically been
used as a way to calculate damages and streamline large class-action cases involving similarly
situated plaintiffs.52 But, “[w]hile it’s [sic] been widely used in complex civil litigation,
statistical sampling has been rarely used in federal False Claims Act litigation.”53 As an
additional matter, statistical sampling, where it has been used in FCA cases, has been used
traditionally for determining damages and not for proving liability.54
The application of statistical sampling for proving liability in FCA cases would thus be a
fairly large step in the evolution of the use of statistical sampling in litigation. In essence, using
statistical sampling to prove liability in a health care fraud case brought under the FCA would

48

United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, No. 8:11-cv-1303-T-23TBM, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis
55384, at *7–8 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2015).
49
Kaye & Freedman, supra note 43, at 243–46.
50
See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 974–77.
51
See, e.g., Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 376–78 (plaintiff attempted to use expert witness
testimony to show that their was market confusion concerning the name “Elgin” based on a survey of two thousand
consumers); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (random sample of five
hundred people showed market confusion in relation to Zippo brand lighters).
52
See Walker & Monahan, supra note 17, at 976–77.
53
See Benedetto, supra note 19.
54
See Benedetto, supra note 19.
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involve taking a small sample of the total number of claims brought against the defendants,
determining liability in the small sample of claims, and then, through the use of an expert witness
statistician, extrapolating liability to the total universe of claims.55 This methodology, which
involves proving liability through what is essentially a mathematical formula—and without any
individual, claim-by-claim review—would be an extraordinary step in FCA litigation. It thus
warrants a cautionary approach.
III. Critique and Analysis of the Reasons Courts Have Given for Allowing Statistical Sampling
Courts that have allowed the use of statistical sampling have typically done so on the
principle that statistical sampling and extrapolation are viable and accurate scientific methods
with a long tradition of use in complex litigation. Other courts go further, reasoning that
statistical sampling is the only viable way of determining liability and ensuring proper recovery
in large-scale qui tam actions. These courts tend to see no reason why the basic methodology
cannot be extended to proving liability, especially in cases involving a large number of claims. It
is somewhat striking, however, that several of the courts that have allowed statistical sampling
have endorsed an almost uninhibited use of statistical sampling, implying that the government
and private relators should be free to use it whenever possible as a means of proving liability.
This perhaps goes too far, as there are various drawbacks to its use.
A. Statistical Sampling as a Practical Necessity
The primary argument for allowing statistical sampling as a means of proving liability is
that it is simply a necessary way of allowing the government and private relators to efficiently
prove liability. This reasoning was put forward succinctly in United States ex rel. Martin v. Life
Care Centers of America: “[g]iven the large number of claims that can be submitted by a single

55

See, e.g., United States ex rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Cmty., Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 82379 (explaining the
basic methodology); United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660 (same).
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entity to be reimbursed by Medicare, it is often not practicable to do a claim-by-claim review
of each allegedly false claim in a complex FCA action.”56 Furthermore, “[t]he purpose of the
FCA as well as the development and expansion of government programs as to which it may be
employed support the use of statistical sampling in complex FCA actions where a claim-byclaim review is impracticable.”57 This sentiment was echoed in United States ex rel. Ruckh v.
Genoa Healthcare, LLC, in which the court stated that it would allow the use of statistical
sampling because, “[c]onsidering the large universe of allegedly false claims in the instant case,
it would be impracticable for the Court to review each claim individually.58 Economic
considerations also played a part in this determination, as the court in Martin stated: “if the Court
were to individually review each allegedly false claim or statement in this action, it would
consume an unacceptable portion of the Court's limited resources.”59
This may well be true of large cases, where there are thousands of claims under review.
In Martin, for instance, the defendant health care provider owned and operated more than twohundred nursing home facilities throughout the United States, and there were over one hundred
thousand claims of fraud at issue.60 Likewise, in Ruckh, the claims against the defendant
involved charges of fraudulent overbilling for patients at each of its fifty-three medical facilities
throughout the state of Florida.61 Indeed, both Martin and Ruckh distinguished an earlier case
that had prohibited the use of statistical sampling, United States v. Friedman, on the grounds that

56

United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *61–62.
Id. at *61.
58
United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55384, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28,
2015).
59
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *46.
60
Id. at *6, 20.
61
United States ex rel. Ruckh v. Genoa Healthcare, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55384, at *2–3.
57
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it involved a substantially smaller number of claims.62 By contrast with Martin and Ruckh,
where thousands of claims were at issue, Friedman only contained 676 total claims.63
But distinguishing Friedman only begs the question of how many claims are enough to
warrant statistical sampling.64 There is no guiding principle to establish the point at which
claim-by-claim review becomes unfeasible, and drawing a line at a particular number seems an
unsatisfactorily arbitrary alternative. To be sure, 676 total claims is not a small number, and the
Friedman court gave no indication that its decision to not allow sampling was based in any way
on the total number of claims.65 Adding to the problem is the fact that the number of claims may
not tell the whole story. Depending on the facts and difficulty of the case, it may be more or less
feasible to perform a claim-by-claim review. Theoretically, two separate cases could have the
same number of claims and, yet, based on their facts, may be differently situated in regards to the
feasibility of claim-by-claim review. Unfortunately, while both cases may in fact have been
correctly decided, neither Martin nor Ruckh provides an answer to the question of how many
claims are enough to warrant statistical sampling.
B. Statistical Sampling as a Viable and Accurate Scientific Methodology
Courts that have allowed statistical sampling also tend to focus on statistical sampling’s
reputation as an accurate and legitimate scientific method. In United States ex rel. Loughren v.
UnumProvident Corp., for instance, the court, in allowing statistical sampling, noted its belief
that “extrapolation is a reasonable method for determining the number of false claims so long as

62

See id. at *9–10 (citing Martin for the proposition that Friedman is distinguishable due to the smaller number of
claims); Martin, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *45 (“Friedman is distinct from the instant case because there was
a sufficiently limited universe of claims for the court to review each one individually rather than relying on
extrapolation.”).
63
United States v. Friedman, No. 86-0610-MA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n. 1 (D. Mass. July 23, 1993).
64
The court in Martin distinguished Friedman due to its smaller number of claims, but put forward no principle to
determine at what point the number of claims becomes too large for claim-by-claim review.
65
See Friedman, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21496, *9 n. 1. There is nothing in the Friedman opinion’s analysis to
suggest its holding was based on a sufficiently limited number of claims.
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the statistical methodology is appropriate.”66 The court in Martin adopted a similar confidence
in statistical sampling, noting that “courts now consider ‘mathematical and statistical methods [to
be] well recognized as reliable and acceptable evidence in determining adjudicative facts.’”67
And while the Martin court recognized that "using extrapolation to establish damages when
liability has been proven is different than using extrapolation to establish liability,” it
nevertheless found no reason not to make the leap towards applying statistical sampling to a
finding of liability.68 Indeed, “the court’s opinion did not significantly engage with the
damages/liability divide.”69 It thus appears, at least in the view of courts adopting statistical
sampling as a means of proving liability, that the same scientific legitimacy that allows for
statistical sampling to be used in calculating damages is equally applicable for using it as a
means of proving liability.70
But whether this is actually true is a closer call than the court opinions in Martin, Ruckh,
and Loughren lead on. Statistics are, after all, an imperfect method, especially when used to
prove a point.71 Statistics are also prone to manipulation.72 As statistician Richard Traflinger
put it:
You can find statistics that show cigarettes are killers and that they have
no effect on anyone's health. You can find statistics that say you should cut down
on the consumption of dairy products and that dairy products are good for you.
You can find statistics that prove that soft drinks will give you cancer and that

66

United States ex rel. Loughren v. UnumProvident Corp., 604 F. Supp. 2d 259, 261 (D. Mass 2009).
United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *29–30 (quoting State of
Ga., Dep't of Human Res. v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404, 409 (N.D. Ga. 1977)).
68
Id. at *39.
69
Recent Case: False Claims Act – Proof of Liability – Eastern District of Tennessee Rules that Statistical
Extrapolation may Suffice to Prove Liability, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2080 (2015).
70
It is perhaps somewhat surprising that many of the courts addressing the statistical sampling question do not
explicitly address the difference between using sampling for a damages calculation and using it to prove liability.
For courts that have accepted statistical sampling for proving liability, it appears implicit in their reasoning that
scientific legitimacy is a major part of the reason why they have accepted it.
71
Richard Traflinger, The Problems With Statistics, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY
http://public.wsu.edu/~taflinge/evistats.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
72
Id.
67
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they have no effect on anything but your thirst (or even that they make you
thirstier). Every one of these sets of statistics is absolutely true.73
This is not to suggest that statistics are never trustworthy or reliable. On the contrary, as many
courts have pointed out, statistical modeling enjoys a great deal of legitimacy and prestige as a
reliable scientific tool in the realms of both academia and the law.74 Traflinger’s point, however,
is that statistics can be fairly arcane and surprisingly complex, and laypersons can be misled by
what they believe is a fairly straightforward statistical model. This is especially important with
regard to FCA litigation, where expert witnesses hired by the parties will perform the statistical
modeling. If statistics can be slanted in any variety of ways to prove the point that their
proponent is attempting to establish, then their use in proving liability warrants caution and
consideration.
Statistics may also be suspect because they “do not tell the whole story,” especially
concerning the relevance and validity of statistical comparisons.75 These observations are
especially relevant in the context of of statistical sampling, which necessarily involves
comparisons between different types of claims. Essentially, evidence of liability for one claim
does not necessarily mean evidence of liability for another claim, especially where the two
claims are factually distinct. Indeed, statistics are especially suspect where evidence of a certain
outcome in one situation is taken to mean evidence of the same outcome in a different
situation,76 which is the exact methodology that would be used to prove liability in FCA cases.
Furthermore, health care fraud cases pose their own unique problems with regard to the
use of statistical sampling in the sense that it is very difficult for statisticians to create “truly

73

Id.
See United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, 28–31.
75
Traflinger, supra note 71.
76
Traflinger, supra note 71.
74
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representative” and homogenous samples.77 For example, in regards to homogeneity of the
sample, it may be difficult for the statistician to differentiate, at least in cases where the
defendant health care provider controls multiple health care organizations, between “different
state Medicaid programs that have different qualifying requirements [for purposes of Medicare
and Medicaid billing],” as well as differences between “rural and suburban, as well as specialty,
hospitals in [the] sample.”78 Simply put, it is difficult to extrapolate claims from a small sample
when that sample is tenuously related to the larger universe of claims, such as where differences
between hospitals, state laws, and billing requirements necessarily create differences that are
exceptionally difficult to quantify in a statistical methodology.79 In this sense, complexity cuts
both ways; claim-by-claim review may well be unfeasible in large and complex FCA health care
fraud cases, but it is this same complexity that cautions against the free and uninhibited use of
statistical sampling.
This is not to say that statistical sampling should never be permissible. No evidentiary
method is perfect, and it may well be said that it is up to the adversarial process, rather than trial
courts, to find flaws in the propagated statistical sampling method.80 Still, the problems inherent
in the use of statistics warrant, at perhaps the very least, a restrained approach. This is especially
true in smaller cases with a manageable number of claims, where the problems associated with
statistical sampling may outweigh the benefits.

Kirby D. Behre & Jeff Ifrah, Statisticians at DOJ may Overstate Case; Government’s Use of Statistical Sampling
to Prove False Claims Act Liability, Damages may be Unreliable, if not Impermissible, 21 NAT’L LAW JOURNAL 22
(1999).
78
See id.
79
See id.
80
See United States ex rel. Martin v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 142660, at *31 (“The opposing
party can challenge the sample through cross-examination of the proponent’s expert, presentation of its own expert,
as well as other competing witnesses and evidence.”).
77

15

IV. Reasons for Limiting the Use of Statistical Sampling
Courts have given a number of justifications for denying the use of statistical sampling,
including concerns that the plaintiff has not met its burden of proof, the fact-specific nature of
many FCA cases, the fact that statistical sampling is not a form of concrete evidence, and the
requirement that plaintiffs must prove each individual claim on its own merits.81 The idea has
also been put forward, by legal scholarship more than case law, that using statistical sampling to
prove liability violates Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that
fraud be pleaded with particularity.82 Finally, at the fringes of the argument is the concept that
using statistical sampling to prove liability violates the defendant’s due process rights.83
A. How the Fact-Specific Nature of Health Care Fraud Cases Warrants Against Statistical
Sampling
Many of the arguments espoused for prohibiting the use of statistical sampling stem from
a little-known, unpublished, and seemingly innocuous case out of the District of Massachusetts,
United States v. Friedman, in which the court declined the government’s request to extrapolate
from a random sample of 350 out of a total of 676 claims prepared and analyzed by an expert
witness.84 The court based this decision on the “existence at trial of discrete claims which were
analyzed and discussed and subjected to cross examination” and which thus necessitated a claimby-claim review.85 The trial judge added that, “[w]hile [he was] mindful of the government's
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efforts to shorten the trial and present its evidence efficiently and clearly, [he was] reluctant to
accept a statistical sampling as the basis for doubling the alleged overpayment without the same
scrutiny and support [as that provided by claim-by-claim review].”86 Sampling was not,
however, one of the case’s main issues, and it was deemed by the trial judge as trivial enough to
be relegated to a footnote.87
This has not stopped courts from relying on Friedman’s reasoning. In United States ex
rel Michaels v. Agape Senior Community, Inc.,88 a case currently on interlocutory appeal,89 the
court “agree[d] with the analysis provided by the District Court in Friedman” and denied the
plaintiffs’ request to use statistical sampling for proving liability.90 In applying the principles of
Friedman to the facts of its own case, the court in Michaels noted that “the patients’ medical
charts are all intact and available for review by either party,” and thus a claim-by-claim
examination of each patient’s medical charts was necessary for determining liability.91 In a
broader sense, the court’s holding seems to imply that extrapolation is not warranted in highly
fact-sensitive cases where each claim is distinct, unique, and warrants individual examination.92
Two other cases, United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington University and
United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., also espouse these principles.
In El-Amin, the defendant health care organization was accused of overbilling for anesthesia
services.93 The relators alleged that the defendants had defrauded Medicare by falsely
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representing that certain anesthesia procedures had been wholly performed by a licensed
anesthesiologist, “when in fact portions of the procedure had been performed by residents or
[nurse anesthetists].”94 Each claim thus necessarily turned on what type of procedure was being
performed and who was performing it.95 In denying the use of statistical sampling, the court
alluded to the fact-specific nature of the case, stating that “[f]or each claim, the Relators will be
expected to provide, at a minimum, the date the claim was filed with Medicare, the name of the
attending anesthesiologist, the type of medical procedure involved, and the amount of the
claim.”96 Similarly, the court in Hockett—a case concerning fraudulent activity related to the
length of patient stays—declined to allow statistical sampling due in part to the highly factsensitive nature of the case.97 In particular, the court noted that in each particular claim, there
could be “many other, completely innocuous alternative explanations for the increased length of
patient stays – such as the patients just getting sicker.”98 Thus, with the facts for each claim in
doubt, the court opted for a traditional claim-by-claim review, as opposed to statistical sampling.
As demonstrated in Michaels, El-Amin, and Hockett, statistical sampling is perhaps a
poor tool in cases where there are large numbers of separate and distinct claims. The courts in
these cases seemed in agreement that the presence of discrete and factually sensitive claims
warranted a claim-by-claim analysis of the relevant evidence. To submit such fact-intensive
inquires to a broad and sweeping extrapolation test is simply counterintuitive, and the principle
behind statistical extrapolation—that a small sample can be necessarily representative of a larger
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sample—loses much of its steam when applied to a situation where each item within the sample
is distinctive from every other.99
B. The Need for Concrete Evidence in FCA Cases
Closely related to the issue of fact-specificity is the necessity, at least in the belief of
some courts, for the government and private relators to prove FCA claims with specific and
concrete evidence.100 In Hockett, for instance, the court held that “welding inferences together
[through statistical sampling] cannot substitute for direct proof.”101 Moreover, the court stated
that it was “imperative for [the] relator to produce real evidence to support her contention that
patients were actually held longer than necessary” as part of the defendant’s scheme to defraud
the government.”102 Though the court was cognizant of the fact that “where some degree of
liability is conceded, slight deviations from traditional modes of proof are tolerable,”103 it
nevertheless held firm in its holding that statistical sampling could not by itself form a basis for
liability in the absence of direct proof and concrete evidence.104
These principles were further expounded in United States ex rel. Crews v. NCS
Healthcare of Illinois., Inc. In Crews, the Plaintiff-relators brought suit against a pharmaceutical
company for the illegal recycling and repurposing of prescription drugs.105 The statistical
sampling methodology used in the case was based on the plaintiff’s assertion that “all claims for
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recycled and redispensed [sic] and medications are false claims” as a matter of law.106 Working
off of this assumption, the plaintiffs then calculated the number of false claims based on the
percentage of patients on Medicaid and the percentage of dispensed medications returned
unused.107 The plaintiffs then argued that the result of this calculation conclusively “prove[d]
that 6% to 12% of recycled drugs would have been [re]distributed to Medicaid recipients” had it
not been for the defendant’s fraudulent activity, and that the defendant was this liable to this
extent.108 In upholding the defendant’s summary judgment motion, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff could not simply rely on a bare calculation to prove liability, but
rather had the burden of establishing liability with proof of actual false claims.109
C. The Strange Case of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
The need for concrete proof to prove liability in FCA cases may also have a statutory
basis in the from of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which states in pertinent part: “In
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake.110 Thus, “under Rule 9(b), mere conclusory allegations of falsity are
insufficient; rather, the plaintiff must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and
why it is false.”111 This would apply to statistical sampling in the sense that each claim must be
proven on its own terms, and liability cannot be proven for a particular claim simply through
extrapolation based on a statistical model. The Department of Justice originally took the position
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that Rule 9(b) did not apply the cases brought under the FCA.112 A string of court rulings in the
late 1990s, however, made clear that Rule 9(b) did in fact apply to FCA cases.113
At least one court has endorsed the view that Rule 9(b) prohibits the use of statistical
sampling to prove liability. In United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp., the plaintiff-relator alleged that the defendant physician had violated the FCA by
submitting claims for unnecessary services.114 In support of these allegations, the plaintiff put
forward as evidence a statistical calculation showing that “in reasonable probability …
approximately 40 percent of claims submitted by defendants for services rendered … were for
services that were not medically necessary.”115 In affirming a judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s
claims, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) because he “provided no factual basis for his belief that defendants
submitted claims for medically unnecessary services other than his reference to statistical
studies.116 The plaintiff’s “allegations, therefore, amount[ed] to nothing more than
speculation.”117
Though seemingly a perfect case for courts looking to add precedential support to a
holding that statistical sampling cannot be used to prove liability, neither Thompson, nor its
approach to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), has remained relevant in the debate over
statistical sampling.118 Indeed, despite its seeming relevancy, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b) has faded entirely from both the case law and scholarship on the issue of statistical
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sampling.119 It is thus fair to say at this point in the debate that whether a court is willing to
allow statistical sampling will depend almost entirely on its own judgment of the need for
concrete evidence for proving specific claims.
D. Possible Shortcomings in Cases that Have Disallowed Statistical Sampling
Much like the cases that have allowed statistical sampling, the cases that have disallowed
the use of statistical sampling have not provided a clear and workable framework for when
statistical should be permitted and when it should not. Also, many, if not all, of the courts that
have prohibited statistical sampling for proving liability have largely ignored or dismissed outof-hand many of the strongest arguments espousing its permissibility, such as the fact that claimby-claim review may be impossible where there is a large universe of claims.120 Nor have these
courts addressed the idea that statistical sampling may be warranted in a case where the claims
are not highly fact-specific, and thus evidence of guilt in one claim necessarily implies evidence
of guilt in the entire universe of claims.121 These courts have thus warned of the dangers of
statistical sampling—dangers which may well be relevant to the facts of the case at hand—
without contemplating that there may be fact patterns where these dangers are extremely limited
or totally non-existent. And simply because statistical sampling is not warranted, or is somehow
dubious, as applied to a particular case, does not necessarily mean that it is never warranted in
any case.
V. A Unified Framework for Statistical Sampling
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That courts have come out differently on the matter of statistical sampling does not
necessarily mean that one side or the other is deciding the cases incorrectly. On the contrary, the
different outcomes may be explained by fundamentally different sets of facts, where the
problems of one approach are clearly evident and the problems of the other approach are
minimal. The problem, it may be said, is not so much one of legal and interpretational conflict
as much as it is the lack of a unifying principle for determining when statistical sampling can be
used and when it cannot. This may be due to the fact that most of the courts that have decided
issues related to statistical sampling are District Courts, and there is thus less of an impetus in
creating law—and thus a unified framework—than there is in simply deciding the case correctly
on its facts. And this lack of a unified principle may of course change after the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals makes a ruling on the Michaels appeal.122
The ensuing framework that forms the basis for this portion of the comment will be an
attempt to consolidate the various competing factors on both sides of the statistical sampling
debate. Ultimately, it will call for a restrained approach to the use of statistical sampling, placing
the burden on the plaintiff to show why the use of statistical sampling is warranted. In meeting
this burden, the plaintiff will have to show some form of undue hardship that necessitates the use
of statistical sampling. Finally, in determining whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the
court should look to three categories: (1) the number of claims; (2) whether the level of factspecificity and the discreteness of the individual claims is such that claim-by-claim review is
necessary; and (3) other factors that may bear on the total outcome of the case, such as bad faith
or consent of the parties. The effect of this framework, at least in a theoretical sense, will be to
allow statistical sampling where it is necessary as the only viable way to ensure recovery, while
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denying the use of statistical sampling in cases where claim-by-claim review is feasible and
necessary.
A. The Need for a Cautious Approach to Statistical Sampling
It would not be unfair to ask why the plaintiff should have the burden of demonstrating
that statistical sampling should be used in a given case. Indeed, it has been argued that there is
nothing wrong with using a “straightforward application of a long-standing and highly efficient
[methodology] …. to efficiently and accurately provide evidence as to liability.123 The answer
lies in the fact that proving liability is a fundamentally different matter from proving damages. It
is one thing to allow a statistical model for a damages calculation where liability has already
been proven; it is quite another to allow a statistical model as the only means of proving liability,
and without any claim-by-claim examination. Proving liability implicates concerns, problems,
and procedural requirements that simply do not factor into a damages analysis.124 This is
especially true given the “quasi-criminal” nature of the FCA.125 Indeed, the argument could be
made “that such extrapolation would unfairly, or at least prematurely, shift the burden to the
[defendant].”126 Simply put, statistical sampling’s speed and efficiency is not worth its
procedural infirmities in cases where claim-by-claim review is otherwise available. It is
therefore necessary for the plaintiff to show something more—some form of hardship—before
statistical sampling is warranted.
Courts endorsing the use of statistical sampling have tried to argue around the issue of
burden shifting. In Martin for instance, the court argued that no burden shifting had taken place
because the defendant still had “the opportunity to depose the Government's expert, challenge
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the qualifications of the Government's expert, retain its own expert, and to present all of this
evidence at trial.”127 The court further solidified its approach to the subject by noting that the
jury would provide a necessary check on the potential abuses of statistical sampling.128 But this
perhaps misses the point. If statistical sampling is not necessary, or even unwarranted in a
particular case, there is simply no valid reason to complicate the matter and risk confusing the
jury solely in the name of efficiency. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that statistical
sampling methodology can be quite complicated.129 It is not a stretch to say that a jury will be
inclined to believe, perhaps without question, an expert’s declaration that a defendant is liable for
a certain percentage of the total number of claims. If the defendant calls an expert witness to
dispute the plaintiff expert’s methodology, then the case will devolve into a mathematical dispute
even where there is readily available evidence to assess each claim on its own merits. This result
is simply untenable where the plaintiff has not shown that statistical sampling is necessary.
It has also been argued that statistical sampling is necessary as a deterrent to stop the
widespread perpetuation of fraud and to ensure that the government receives a full recovery of
the money it has lost through fraud.130 This is certainly true of cases where there are a large
number of homogenous claims.131 It is far less certain in cases with a smaller number of discrete
claims. More importantly, this argument ignores the fact that the FCA contains both a treble
damages provision as well as the potential for significant fines.132 This means that for every
claim where liability is found the government is receiving essentially three claims worth of
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recovery, even without consideration of potential fines. This greatly undermines any notion that
statistical sampling is necessary as a deterrent or as a way of assuring full recovery. On the
contrary, it may be argued that the use of statistical sampling in conjunction with fines and treble
damages is quite plainly punitive.133
B. Determining Whether the Plaintiff Has Met the Burden of Establishing that Statistical
Sampling is Warranted
With the need for a restrained approach to statistical sampling—and thus a presumption
against its use—now established, it is now necessary to provide an analysis of the factors courts
must consider in determining whether the plaintiff has successfully met its burden of showing
that statistical sampling is warranted by the facts of the case. The ensuing three-factor test is a
synthesis of the various concerns and considerations framing the statistical sampling debate. It is
designed to provide a flexible framework that can be applied to the facts of any given case. No
factor in this test is solely determinative, and it is open to a not insignificant amount of
interpretation. This malleability is necessary, however, given the wide range of factual scenarios
arising in health care fraud cases. It should be noted that, before this three-factor test can be
applied, the plaintiffs must prove liability in at least one instance.134 A bare statistical
calculation applied to the entire universe of claims will not suffice without an underlying finding
of liability based on some form of concrete evidence.135
1. The Number of Claims
There is an unavoidable connection between the number of claims in a case and the factspecificity of the claims at issue. On one hand, a high number of claims undoubtedly warrant the
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use of statistical sampling.136 On the other hand, a universe of highly discrete claims warrants
claim-by-claim review.137 It seems clear, however, that where claim-by-claim review is
completely untenable due to a large number of claims, statistical sampling is warranted.138 This
is especially true considering the fact that “large-scale perpetrators of fraud would reap the
benefits” of a system that did not allow statistical sampling in cases with a large number of
claims, “because the government could not possibly pursue each individual claim.”139 Indeed, it
may be said that Martin, in allowing extrapolation to the tens of thousands of total claims at
issue, “ensured perpetrators of fraud would not be able to escape liability because of the broad
scope of their fraud.”140 On the other hand, Michaels, in not allowing a statistical model to
extrapolate for thousands of claims at issue, may well have been wrongly decided.141
The point at which the number of total claims makes claim-by-claim review untenable
will be a function of the claims’ overall discreteness. A high number of discrete, fact-specific
claims will require a greater number of total claims before the court determines that claim-byclaim review is unfeasible. Conversely, the court can allow statistical sampling for a much lower
number of claims where the claims at issue are largely homogenous.142 In this way, the first
factor of the framework serves the double purpose of allowing statistical sampling where it is
absolutely necessary or where the risks are relatively small, while also protecting against its use
where the claims’ discreteness warrants a greater deference to claim-by-claim review.
2. Whether the Level of Fact-Specificity and the Discreteness of the Individual Claims is
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Such that Claim-by-Claim Review is Necessary
This portion of the framework is designed to ensure that statistical sampling will rarely, if
ever, be used where claim-by-claim review is feasible. The only exception would be where the
claims are so homogenous in nature that proof of liability in one claim necessarily means a proof
of liability in all, or at least a substantial number, of claims.143 The principle behind this factor is
simply that it runs counter to the basic and long-established principles of American jurisprudence
to relieve the plaintiff from presenting specific evidence for each individual claim when such
evidence is readily available. Had statistical sampling been used in cases such as Michaels or ElAmin, the court would have essentially been allowing an inference to take the place of readily
available hard evidence.144 While there is an understandable need for expediency in litigation,
the price of ignoring especially relevant evidence in the place of an inference hardly seems worth
the risk. In essence, the plaintiff will be unable to meet its burden of demonstrating that
statistical sampling is warranted so long as the total number of claims is manageable in number
and sufficiently discrete and heterogeneous in composition.
It should also be made clear exactly what is meant by terms such as “fact-specificity” and
“discreteness.” In general, these terms apply to the level of homogeneity within a particular
universe of claims. For example, a defendant in a particular case may provide only one type of
health care service and the claims at issue may apply to only one type of treatment or billing
procedure.145 In such a case, there would be a high level of homogeneity in the total universe of
claims because every claim at issue relates to roughly the same type of fraudulent activity
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conducted in roughly the same way. The fact-specificity and discreteness of each individual
claim would therefore be relatively small.
By contrast, a particular universe of claims may be highly discrete where the defendant
operates multiple businesses in multiple states and in varying forms of health care practice and
treatment.146 In such an instance, a statistical model based on data from a specific institution in a
specific state would have little relation to other claims stemming from other institutions in other
states. In such a case, the trial court would be forced to determine whether statistical sampling is
feasible given the defendant’s complex administrative scheme.

3. Other Mitigating Factors
This third category is designed as a catchall category for any number of extenuating
circumstances that may warrant the use of statistical sampling. For instance, statistical sampling
would be perfectly permissible where the defendant has consented to its use.147 Nor would
statistical sampling be impermissible where a default judgment has been entered against the
defendant.148 It would also be warranted where there has been bad faith on the part of the
defendants, or where the destruction of evidence has left the plaintiff, through no fault of the
plaintiff’s own, with no other feasible means of proving liability.149 It must be stated, however,
that courts should use caution and restraint in deciding when novel circumstances call for the use
of statistical sampling for proving liability.
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VI. Conclusion
Statistical sampling has the potential to be an extremely powerful tool if permitted for use
in proving liability in FCA cases.150 As such, its application warrants a great degree of
thoughtfulness, lest its uninhibited use become a vehicle for abuse. The fact that statistical
sampling carries with it both great benefits and great drawbacks only creates further complexity.
And with health care fraud cases increasing each year, the need for a resolution to the divided
view on statistical sampling is not only necessary, but also pressing.
By creating a unified framework under which all statistical sampling cases can be
analyzed, this comment hopes to bridge the divide between the courts by expounding a set of
principles that allows for statistical sampling when the benefits are large and the risks are small,
and which prohibits statistical sampling where the benefits are slight and the risks are pervasive.
Ultimately, this framework seeks to ensure the dual purposes of not allowing “widespread fraud
to go unpunished,”151 while also minimizing the risk that plaintiffs will be able to bypass
traditional procedural safeguards where doing so would not be helpful or necessary.152 The
result is a standard for analyzing statistical sampling that ensures fundamental fairness for the
parties, predictable results, and a stable set of enduring principles against which future claims
can be analyzed.
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